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Abstract In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility
games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point
solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consis-
tency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class
of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most
important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to
the Shapley value are exploited in order to axiomatize such values with reference to a
slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consis-
tency. The latter axiom requires that the solutions of the initial game and its associated
game (with the same player set, but a different characteristic function) coincide.
Keywords Cooperative game · Associated game · Linear value ·
Shapley value · Consistency
JEL Classification C71
1 Introduction
Formally, a transferable utility game (or cooperative game or coalitional game with
side payments) is a pair 〈N , v〉, where N is a finite set of at least two players and
v : 2N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N
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(notation: i ∈ N ) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2N with
S = ∅) is called a player and coalition respectively, and the real number v(S) is called
the worth of coalition S. The size (cardinality) of coalition S is denoted by |S| or, if
no ambiguity is possible, by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N . Let
G denote the universal game space consisting of all TU games. A TU game 〈N , v〉 is
called superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅.
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem
of how to divide, for any TU game 〈N , v〉, the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition N
among the players. Particularly, the one-point solution theory associates with any TU
game a single allocation called the value of the TU game. Formally, a value on G is
a function  that assigns a single payoff vector (N , v) = (i (N , v))i∈N ∈ RN to
every game 〈N , v〉 ∈ G. The so-called value i (N , v) of player i in the game 〈N , v〉
represents an assessment by i of his gains for participating in the game. Without going
into details, the well-known Shapley value Sh(N , v) = (Shi (N , v))i∈N ∈ RN is as
follows (Driessen 1988; Roth 1988; Shapley 1953): for all i ∈ N
Shi (N , v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
1
n ·
(
n − 1
s
) · [v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] . (1)
The eldest axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated in 1953 by Shapley himself
by referring to four properties called efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player
property. The most recent axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated by Hamiache
(2001) who proposed a new set of axioms called the “inessential game property”,
“continuity”, and “associated consistency”. The purpose of this paper is to extend
Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of
which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class
of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value will be exploited to provide an
axiomatization based on a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a
similar associated consistency. Concerning values for games, firstly we review several
properties treated in former axiomatizations of the Shapley value and secondly, we
recall four equivalent interpretations of the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear
values.
Definition 1 A value  on the universal game space G possesses
(i) efficiency, if ∑
i∈N
i (N , v) = v(N ) for all games 〈N , v〉;
(ii) symmetry, ifπ(i)(N , πv) = i (N , v) for all games 〈N , v〉, all i ∈ N , and every
permutation π on N . Here the game 〈N , πv〉 is defined by (πv)(π S) := v(S)
for all S ⊆ N ;
(iii) linearity, if (N , α · v + β · w) = α · (N , v) + β · (N , w) for all games
〈N , v〉, 〈N , w〉, and all α ∈ R, β ∈ R. Here the game 〈N , α · v + β · w〉 is
defined by (α · v + β · w)(S) := α · v(S) + β · w(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
(iv) inessential game property, if i (N , v) = v({i}) for all inessential games 〈N , v〉,
and all i ∈ N . Here the game 〈N , v〉 is inessential if v(S) = ∑ j∈S v({ j}) for
all S ⊆ N , S = ∅;
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(v) continuity, if for any (pointwise) convergent sequence {〈N , vm〉}∞m=0 of games,
say the limit of which is the game 〈N , v˜〉, the corresponding sequence
{(N , vm)}∞m=0 of values converges to the value (N , v˜).
Throughout this paper we deal with two adaptations of games. The first adaptation
of a given game 〈N , v〉 concerns the following optimistic self-evaluation by coalitions.
Every coalition S evaluates its own worth vShλ (S) in the associated game 〈N , vShλ 〉 as
the sum of its initial worth v(S) and a percentage λ ∈ [0, 1] of all possible surpluses
v(S ∪ { j}) − v(S) − v({ j}) arising from mutual cooperation (instead of non-coop-
eration) among S itself and j ∈ N\S.1 For superadditive games 〈N , v〉, we have
vShλ (S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , while for inessential games 〈N , v〉vShλ (S) = v(S).
Further, the worth of the grand coalition N does not change under this adaptation, i.e.,
vShλ (N ) = v(N ).
Associated consistency requires that the value be invariant under the adaptation
of the game into its associated game. Because payoffs to players neither increase nor
decrease, there are not adverse effects of such optimistic self-evaluations by coalitions.
Definition 2 (cf. Hamiache 2001)
(i) Given any game 〈N , v〉 and λ ∈ [0, 1], define its (standard) associated game
〈N , vShλ 〉 as follows: for all S ⊆ N ,
vShλ (S) := v(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[v(S ∪ { j}) − v(S) − v({ j})] . (2)
(ii) A value  on G possesses associated consistency with respect to the associated
game of (2) if (N , vShλ ) = (N , v) for all games 〈N , v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1].
The second adaptation of a game concerns a check of credibility of the characteristic
function by an independent arbiter. The task of the arbiter is to perform a scaling
operation by taking into account the sizes of both the player set and the coalition (but
not the coalition itself). That is, for every coalition S ⊆ N , its initial worth v(S) is
scaled down or up to bns · v(S) by some non-negative scaling number bns ≥ 0, where
s denotes the size of coalition S. For example, if bns = 1s , then the scaling operation
involves averaging the worth of any coalition different from the grand coalition N . By
convention, bnn = 1 in order to guarantee the invariant worth of the grand coalition.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, let N = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} denote the set of all
natural numbers and let B = {bns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} denote a collection
of non-negative scaling constants with bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2. No scaling at all is
expressed by the collection U of unit constants (equal to one).
1 To be coherent with Hamiache’s (2001, pp. 281–282) myopic vision of the environment, every coalition
S ignores the links existing between players in N\S. As a consequence, a coalition S considers itself at the
center of a star-like graph, which is equivalent to say that coalition S considers players in N\S as isolated
elements. Following the additional “divide and rule” behavior of the coalitions, S may believe that the
appropriation of at least a part of the surpluses v(S ∪ { j}) − v(S) − v({ j}), generated by its cooperation
with each one of the isolated players j ∈ N\S, is within reach.
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Definition 3 Given a collection B of non-negative scaling constants and any game
〈N , v〉 with at least two players, define its B-scaled game 〈N ,Bv〉 as follows:
(Bv)(∅) := 0 and
(Bv)(S) := bns · v(S) for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅.
In view of the explicit formula (1), it follows immediately that the Shapley value pos-
sesses the inessential game property and continuity, whereas non-trivial calculations
are necessary to verify the associated consistency of the Shapley value with respect to
the associated game of (2), that is Sh(N , vShλ ) = Sh(N , v) for all games 〈N , v〉, and
all λ ∈ [0, 1]. The main theorem in Hamiache (2001, p. 282) states that the Shapley
value is the unique value verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and asso-
ciated consistency with respect to the associated game of (2) (provided 0 < λ < 2
n
).
The uniqueness proof is rather tough and full of combinatorial calculations.
In the remainder, we aim to develop a similar axiomatization for any efficient, sym-
metric, and linear value. The explicit relationship between the Shapley value and any
efficient, symmetric, and linear value is listed in the following fundamental theorem.
One out of four equivalent statements refers to the adaptation of the game into its
B-scaled game.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Theorem) The next four statements for a value ψ on the
universal game space G are equivalent.
(i) ψ possesses efficiency, symmetry, and linearity.
(ii) There exists a (unique) collection of constants {ρns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s =
1, 2, . . . , n − 1} such that, for every n-person game 〈N , v〉 with at least two
players, the value payoff vector (ψi (N , v))i∈N ∈ RN is of the following form
(Ruiz 1998, Lemma 9, p.117): for all i ∈ N
ψi (N , v) = v(N )
n
+
∑
SN ,
Si
ρns
s
· v(S) −
∑
S⊆N ,
S i
ρns
n − s · v(S). (3)
(iii) There exists a (unique) collection of constants B = {bns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s =
1, 2, . . . , n} with bnn := 1 such that, for every n-person game 〈N , v〉 with at
least two players, the value payoff vector (ψi (N , v))i∈N ∈ RN is of the follow-
ing form: for all i ∈ N
ψi (N , v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
1
n ·
(
n − 1
s
) · [bns+1 · v(S ∪ {i}) − bns · v(S)
]
. (4)
(iv) There exists a (unique) collection of constants B = {bns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s =
1, 2, . . . , n} with bnn := 1 such that ψ(N , v) = Sh(N ,Bv) for every game
〈N , v〉 with at least two players, i.e.,
ψi (N , v) = Shi (N ,Bv) for all i ∈ N. (5)
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It is left to the reader to verify, by straightforward computations, that the expres-
sion on the right hand of (3) agrees with the one on the right hand of (4) by choosing
bns =
(
n
s
) · ρns for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. Whenever bns = 1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
the expression on the right hand of (4) reduces to the Shapley value payoff (1) of player
i in the n-person game 〈N , v〉 itself, that is, ψ = Sh. Generally speaking, in view of
(1), the right hand of (4) equals the Shapley value payoff Shi (N ,Bv) of player i in the
B-scaled game 〈N ,Bv〉. In summary, the Equivalence Theorem 1 states that a value
ψ is efficient, symmetric, and linear if and only if the ψ-value of a game coincides
with the Shapley value of the B-scaled game. Throughout the development of the new
theory and the forthcoming proofs we prefer to use the equality ψ(N , v) = Sh(N ,Bv)
among value payoff vectors.
Example 1 Given the separable contribution SCi (N , v) := v(N ) − v(N\{i}) of any
player i ∈ N in the game 〈N , v〉, the egalitarian distribution of the remaining non-
separable contribution NSC(N , v) := v(N ) − ∑ j∈N SC j (N , v) yields the so-called
egalitarian non-separable contribution ENSC-value. That is, for all games 〈N , v〉,
ENSCi (N , v) = SCi (N , v) + NSC(N , v)
n
for all i ∈ N .
It is easy to verify that the E N SC-value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value
and in fact, its corresponding collection B = {bns } of scaling constants is given by
bnn = 1, bnn−1 = n − 1, and bns = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 2. By Equivalence Theorem
1, ENSC(N , v) = Sh(N ,Bv) for all games 〈N , v〉.
Definition 4 Let B = {bns } be a collection of non-negative scaling constants with
bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2.
(i) A game 〈N , v〉 is called B-inessential if its B-scaled game 〈N ,Bv〉 is inessen-
tial, i.e., (Bv)(S) = ∑ j∈S(Bv)({ j}) for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅, or equivalently,
bns · v(S) =
∑
j∈S bn1 · v({ j}).
(ii) A value  on G possesses B-inessential game property if i (N , v) = bn1 · v({i})
for all B − inessential games 〈N , v〉, and all i ∈ N .
Alternatively, with respect to a given collection of positive constants B, a game
〈N , v〉 is B-inessential if and only if there exists a vector x = (xk)k∈N ∈ RN such
that v(S) = bn1bns ·
∑
j∈S x j for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅. In words, a game is B-inessential if
it is decomposable as a product of an inessential game (associated with some vector
x ∈ RN ) and a B-symmetric game.
For example, the game 〈N , v〉 with characteristic function v(S) = |S|2 for all
S  N , and v(N ) = |N |, is B-inessential with respect to the averaging collection
of constants bns = 1s . Generally speaking, for arbitrary positive numbers α and p,
the game 〈N , v〉 with characteristic function v(S) = α · |S|p for all S  N , and
v(N ) = α · |N |, is B-inessential with respect to the collection of constants bns = s1−p.
We conclude this section with the claim that any efficient, symmetric, and lin-
ear value ψ on G satisfies the B-inessential game property, provided the collection
of non-negative constants B corresponds to ψ through (5). Indeed, by applying the
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equivalence (5) and the well-known inessential game property for the Shapley value to
the B-scaled game, it follows that ψi (N , v) = Shi (N ,Bv) = (Bv)({i}) = bn1 · v({i})
for all B-inessential games 〈N , v〉, and all i ∈ N . For example, the E N SC-value
satisfies the B-inessential game property, where the scaling constants are zero, except
for bnn = 1, bnn−1 = n − 1.
2 Extended associated consistency
Recall that an independent arbiter is supposed to scale down or up any game through
a collection of non-negative scaling constants B. Incorporating this scaling operation,
the B-associated game is meant to represent the optimistic self-evaluation by coali-
tions, mathematically expressed as the associated game of the scaled version of the
initial game. Throughout this section let B = {bns } be a collection of positive scaling
constants with bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2.
Definition 5 Let U denote the collection of unit constants (equal to one).
(i) Given any game 〈N , v〉 and λ ∈ [0, 1], define its B-associated game 〈N , vBλ 〉 as
follows: vBλ (∅) := 0 and for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
(B(vBλ ))(S) := (Bv)(S) + λ
∑
j∈N\S
[(Bv)(S ∪ { j}) − (Bv)(S) − (Bv)({ j})],
or equivalently,
bns vBλ (S) := bns v(S) + λ
∑
j∈N\S
[
bns+1v(S ∪ { j}) − bns v(S) − bn1v({ j})
]
. (6)
(ii) Particularly, for all games 〈N , w〉, all λ ∈ [0, 1], and all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
wUλ (S) := w(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[w(S ∪ { j}) − w(S) − w({ j})] .
(iii) A value  on G satisfies B-consistency with respect to the B-associated game
of (6) if (N , vBλ ) = (N , v) for all games 〈N , v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Firstly, note that the U-associated game agrees with the standard associated game,
i.e., 〈N , vUλ 〉 = 〈N , vShλ 〉. Secondly, notice that the B-scaled version of the B-associ-
ated game 〈N , vBλ 〉 agrees with the U-associated game of the B-scaled version of the
initial game 〈N , v〉. In formula, for all games 〈N , v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
〈N ,B(vBλ )〉 = 〈N , (Bv)Uλ 〉 (7)
Alternatively, it turns out that the B-scaling operator and the two associated game
operators with respect to the two collections of scaling constants B and U generate a
commutative diagram. The scaling operation requires a collection of positive scaling
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constants B since zero constants may cause problems for the B-associated game to be
well-defined. For example, in the setting of the ENSC-value, its corresponding collec-
tion of scaling constants B = {bns } is given by bnn = 1, bnn−1 = n − 1, and bns = 0 for
all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 2. Consequently, (6) is not solvable for vBλ (S) with |S| = n − 2 due
to bnn−2 = 0, bn1 = 0, whereas bnn−1 = 0.
Proposition 1 Let ψ be the efficient, symmetric, and linear value on G, corresponding
to a collection of positive scaling constants B. Then
(i) ψ satisfies B-consistency, i.e., ψ(N , vBλ ) = ψ(N , v) for all games 〈N , v〉, and
all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) ψ satisfies the B-inessential game property.
(iii) ψ satisfies continuity.
Proof (i) By applying the Equivalence Theorem to the value ψ twice, the game equal-
ity (7), and the U-consistency for the Shapley value (Hamiache 2001, p. 282) applied to
the B-scaled game, respectively, it follows for all games 〈N , v〉 ∈ G, and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
ψ(N , vBλ )
(5)= Sh(N ,B(vBλ )) (7)= Sh(N , (Bv)Uλ ) = Sh(N ,Bv) (5)= ψ(N , v).
This proves B-consistency for ψ , whereas the B-inessential game property for ψ
was already proven at the end of the previous section.
(iii) Finally, continuity for ψ holds because the Shapley value satisfies continuity.
Given any (pointwise) convergent sequence {〈N , vk〉}∞k=0 of games, say the limit of
which is the game 〈N , v˜〉, the sequence {〈N ,B(vk)〉}∞k=0 of B-scaled games converges
too, the limit of which is the B-scaled game 〈N ,Bv˜〉. Consequently, the correspond-
ing sequence {Sh(N ,B(vk))}∞k=0 of Shapley values converges to the Shapley value
Sh(N ,Bv˜), or equivalently, the corresponding sequence {ψ(N , vk)}∞k=0 of values con-
verges to the value ψ(N , v˜). 
Now we are able to state our main result, an axiomatic characterization of any efficient,
symmetric, and linear value. The uniqueness part of its proof will be treated in the
next section.
Theorem 2 Let B be a collection of positive scaling constants. There exists a unique
value  on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-consistency
with respect to the B-associated game of (6) (provided 0 < λ < 2
n
). The value  is the
efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ on G induced by B (see (4) or equivalently,
ψ(N , v) = Sh(N ,Bv) for all games 〈N , v〉).
3 Proof of uniqueness part of Theorem 2
Throughout this section, let B = {bns } be a collection of positive scaling constants with
bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2. In comparison to Hamiache’s proof of uniqueness in the setting
of the Shapley value, our current approach is similar by applying the adapted B-associ-
ated game procedure repeatedly. That is, the notion of m-repeated B-associated game
〈N , vm∗Bλ 〉 will be introduced in such a way that v1∗Bλ = vBλ and v2∗Bλ = (vBλ )Bλ and
v3∗Bλ = (v2∗Bλ )Bλ and so on.
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Definition 6 Let B be a collection of positive scaling constants, 〈N , v〉 ∈ G, and
λ ∈ [0, 1]. Recall Definition 5 of the B-associated game 〈N , vBλ 〉 of (6).
(i) For all m ∈ N, let the m-repeated B-associated game 〈N , vm∗Bλ 〉 be defined
recursively by vm∗Bλ := (v(m−1)∗Bλ )
B
λ
, where v0∗Bλ := v and v1∗Bλ := vBλ . For
simplicity of notation, from now on we omit the symbols with reference to λ.
(ii) For all m ∈ N, denote the game representation of the m-repeated B-associated
game 〈N , vm∗B〉 as a linear combination of the worth v(T ) for all coalitions
T ⊆ N , T = ∅, by
vm∗B(S) =
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm,B(T ) · v(T ) for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅. (8)
We distinguish two tasks. The first task concerns the study of these game represen-
tations (8) in order to present an interrelationship between two game representations,
switching from an arbitrary collection of constants B to the standard collection of
unit constants U . The forthcoming interrelationship (9) is rather appealing since it
takes into account only the quotient of two constants from the collection B. As an
adjunct, we derive the extended version of (7) in that the B-scaled game of the m-
repeated B-associated game equals the m-repeated standard associated game of the
B-scaled game, that is B(vm∗B) = (Bv)m∗U . The two proofs are independent from
Hamiache’s work in the setting of the Shapley value. The second task concerns the
study of convergence of any sequence {γ S
m,B(T )}∞m=1, for fixed coalitions S, T . Due
to the completion of the first task, the former sequence converges if and only if the
standard sequence {γ S
m,U (T )}∞m=1 converges, which convergence problems has been
completely solved in Hamiache’s work 2001. Nevertheless, since the outcomes of
these convergent sequences are slightly different, it is necessary to present the last
stage of a slightly adapted proof of uniqueness.
3.1 Interrelationships between game representations
Proposition 2 Concerning the n-person game representations (8), for all m ∈ N, all
S ⊆ N , S = ∅, for all T ⊆ N , T = ∅,
γ Sm,B(T ) =
bnt
bns
· γ Sm,U (T ). (9)
Hence, 〈N ,B(vm∗B)〉 = 〈N , (Bv)m∗U 〉, i.e., (B(vm∗B))(S) = (Bv)m∗U (S) for all
S ⊆ N.
Proof Let 〈N , v〉 ∈ G. The proof of (9) is rather technical (proceeding by induc-
tion on m ≥ 1) and will be postponed till the appendix. However, (9) as well as
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the game representation (8) are helpful to establish the proof of the latter game equal-
ity 〈N ,B(vm∗B)〉 = 〈N , (Bv)m∗U 〉. For all m ∈ N, all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
(B(vm∗B))(S) = bns · (vm∗B(S)) (8)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm,B(T ) · bns · v(T )
(9)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm,U (T ) · bnt · v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm,U (T ) · (Bv)(T )
(8)= (Bv)m∗U (S)
unionsq
3.2 Convergence results
Hamiache’s results 5 and 6 (2001, p. 285) state that, for all coalitions S and T , the
standard sequence {γ S
m,U (T )}∞m=1 converges provided 0 < λ < 2n (the proof of result 6
is rather complex). Hence, by (9), for all coalitions S, T , and all collections of positive
constants B, the induced sequence {γ S
m,B(T )}∞m=1 converges too. The limit is denoted
by γ˜ SB(T ). Define the limit game 〈N , v˜B〉 by
v˜B(S) =
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ˜ SB(T ) · v(T ) for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅. (10)
By (8), the sequence {〈N , vm∗B〉}∞m=1 of repeated B-associated games converges
(pointwise) to the limit game 〈N , v˜B〉. For any value  satisfying continuity, the cor-
responding sequence {(N , vm∗B)}∞m=1 of values converges to the value (N , v˜B).
If, in addition, the value  satisfies B-consistency, then (N , vm∗B) = (N , v) for
all m ∈ N. Hence, by convergence, (N , v˜B) = (N , v). In the setting of the stan-
dard collection with unit constants U , Hamiache’s result 8 (2001, p. 288) states that
the limit game 〈N , v˜U 〉 is inessential. In our current framework with reference to an
arbitrary collection of positive constants B, we claim that the limit game 〈N , v˜B〉 is
B-inessential, that is the B-scaled game 〈N ,B(v˜B)〉 is inessential. The proof of the
fundamental claim will be based on the following convergence results taken from
Hamiache’s former work.
Theorem 3 (Hamiache 2001, Results 7, 6, 5, pp.287, 285, 285 respectively).
Let 0 < λ < 2
n
, and S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and T ⊆ N , T = ∅. Then
(i) γ˜ SU (T ) =
∑
j∈S
γ˜
{ j}
U (T ) (11)
(ii) γ˜ SU (T ) =
1
n − t ·
∑
j∈T
γ˜ SU (T \{ j}) provided 2 ≤ t < n. (12)
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(iii)
γ˜ SU ({ j}) =
{
n−s
n·(n−1) , if j ∈ S,−s
n·(n−1) , if j ∈ S.
(13)
Corollary 1 Let 0 < λ < 2
n
, and S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and T ⊆ N , T = ∅. Then
(i)
γ˜ SB(T ) =
bnt
bns
· γ˜ SU (T ) (14)
(ii)
γ˜ SB(T ) =
bn1
bns
·
∑
j∈S
γ˜
{ j}
B (T ) (15)
(iii)
γ˜ SB(T ) =
1
n − t ·
bnt
bnt−1
·
∑
j∈T
γ˜ SB(T \{ j}) provided 2 ≤ t < n. (16)
(iv)
γ˜ SB({ j}) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
bn1
bns
· n−s
n·(n−1) , if j ∈ S,
bn1
bns
· −s
n·(n−1) , if j ∈ S.
(17)
Notice that (14) follows immediately from (9) by convergence and in turn, (15)–(17)
are direct restatements of (11)–(13) of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 Let 〈N , v〉 ∈ G and 0 < λ < 2
n
. Then the following holds:
(i) The limit game 〈N , v˜B〉 is B-inessential, that is 〈N ,B(v˜B)〉 is inessential.
(ii) For all T ⊆ N satisfying 2 ≤ t < n
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) =
1
n − t ·
bnt
bnt−1
·
∑
j∈T
γ˜
{i}
B (T \{ j}) for all i ∈ N; (18)
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
bnt
bn1
· (t−1)!·(n−t)!
n! , if i ∈ T ,
−bnt
bn1
· t !·(n−1−t)!
n! , if i ∈ T .
(19)
(iii)
v˜B({i}) = Shi (N ,Bv)bn1
for all i ∈ N. (20)
The technical proof of Theorem 4 is postponed till the appendix.
Proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 2
Parts (i) and (iii) of Theorem 4 remain to complete the uniqueness part of the charac-
terization of Theorem 2. Suppose a value  on the universal game space G possesses
the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-consistency with respect to the B-
associated game of (6). Let 〈N , v〉 ∈ G. As shown in the paragraph above Theorem 3,
the latter two axioms imply the equality (N , v˜B) = (N , v). By Theorem 4(i), the
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limit game 〈N , v˜B〉 is B-inessential and thus, from the B-inessential game property
for  we derive the following:
i (N , v) = i (N , v˜B) = bn1 · v˜B({i}) (20)= Shi (N ,Bv) for all i ∈ N .
Hence, (N , v)= Sh(N ,Bv)=ψ(N , v) for all games 〈N , v〉, where ψ is the effi-
cient, symmetric, and linear value on G induced by B (see (5)). So,  = ψ . unionsq
4 Concluding remarks
In order to apply Theorem 2 to some subclasses of efficient, symmetric, and linear
values, we discuss the class of least square values, which, in turn, includes the additive
efficient normalization of any semi-value.
Example 2 The solidarity value Sol(N , v) of a game 〈N , v〉 is defined by some ex-
pected average marginal contribution over all coalitions containing the player as fol-
lows (Nowak 1994):
Soli (N , v) =
∑
S⊆N ,
i∈S
1
n ·
(
n − 1
s − 1
) ·
∑
j∈S
[
v(S) − v(S\{ j})
s
]
for all i ∈ N .
It is known that the solidarity value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in
fact, its corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {bns } is given by bns = 1s+1
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 with bnn = 1. By Theorem 2, the solidarity value is the unique
value  on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-consistency
with respect to the B-associated game 〈N , vBλ 〉 of (6) defined by vBλ (∅) = 0 and for
all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
vBλ (S)
s + 1 =
v(S)
s + 1 + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
v(S ∪ { j})
s + 2 −
v(S)
s + 1 −
v({ j})
2
]
.
Example 3 Let P = {pns | n ∈ N\{0}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} be a (yet unspec-
ified) collection of probability distributions satisfying the normalization condition∑n
s=1
(
n−1
s−1
) · pns = 1 and the inverse Pascal triangle conditions pn−1s = pns + pns+1 for
all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, all n ≥ 2. For all games 〈N , v〉 ∈ G, let the corresponding
semi-value SEP (N , v) and its additive efficient normalization E SEP (N , v) be de-
fined as follows (Ruiz 1998, pp. 119–120): for all i ∈ N
SEPi (N , v) =
∑
S⊆N ,
i∈S
pns · [v(S) − v(S\{i})] and
E SEPi (N , v) = SEPi (N , v) +
1
n
·
⎡
⎣v(N ) −
∑
j∈N
SEPj (N , v)
⎤
⎦ .
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Clearly, the additive efficient normalization satisfies efficiency and inherits linearity
and symmetry from its underlying semi-value. Consequently, the additive efficient nor-
malization of any semi-value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in fact, its
corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {bns } is given by bns = s ·
(
n−1
s
)· pn−1s
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 with bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2. By Theorem 2, for any collection of
positive probability distributions P , the additive efficient normalization E SEP of the
underlying semi-value SEP is the unique value  on G verifying the B-inessential
game property, continuity, and B-consistency with respect to the B-associated game
〈N , vBλ 〉 of (6). Clearly, the Shapley value arises as the (unique efficient) semi-value
SEP where pns = 1
n·
(
n − 1
s − 1
) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
Example 4 Let 〈N , v〉 ∈ G. With every (yet unspecified) collection of nonnegative
constants M = {mns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n−1}, there is associated the least
square value L SM(N , v) to be defined as the unique optimal solution of the following
optimization problem of which the objective function is given by the weighted sum
of the square of the “excesses” of all non-trivial coalitions (the so-called least square
problem, Ruiz 1998, pp. 113–114):
Minimize
∑
S⊆N ,
S =N ,S =∅
mns ·
⎡
⎣v(S) −
∑
j∈S
x j
⎤
⎦
2
subject to x = (x j ) j∈N ∈ RN such that
∑
j∈N
x j = v(N ).
Ruiz et al. (1998, Theorem 8, p. 116) showed that the class of least square values
is fully characterized by the following five properties: efficiency, linearity, symme-
try, coalitional monotonicity, and inessential game property. As such, the least square
family contains the additive efficient normalization of any semi-value. Particularly, it
turns out that the Shapley value agrees with the least square value L SM whenever
mns = 1
(n−1)·
(
n − 2
s − 1
) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1. The solidarity value does not agree with
any least square value since it violates the inessential game property.
In fact (Ruiz 1998, p. 114), every least square value L SM is of the form (3) associ-
ated with the constants ρns = s·(n−s)n · m
n
s
SM(n) or equivalently, of the form (4) associated
with the scaling constants bns = s ·
(
n − 1
s
)
· mnsSM(n) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, where
SM(n) :=
∑n−1
s=1
(
n − 2
s − 1
)
· mns for all n ≥ 2.
By Theorem 2, for any collection of positive constants M, the corresponding least
square value L SM is the unique value  on G verifying the B-inessential game prop-
erty, continuity, and B-consistency with respect to the B-associated game 〈N , vBλ 〉
of (6).
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Appendix: Two additional proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Let 〈N , v〉 ∈ G. The proof of (9) proceeds by induction on
m ≥ 1. If m = 1, then it follows from (7) and the game representation (8) applied to
the B-scaled game, that it holds for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
bns · vB(S) = (B(vB))(S) (7)= (Bv)U (S)
(8)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ S1,U (T ) · (Bv)(T ) =
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ S1,U (T ) · bnt · v(T ).
Thus, vB(S) = ∑T⊆N ,
T =∅
bnt
bns
· γ S1,U (T ) · v(T ) and hence, γ S1,B(T ) = b
n
t
bns
· γ S1,U (T ) for all
T ⊆ N , T = ∅, due to the unique representation (8) applied to the term vB(S). So,
(9) holds if m = 1.
Suppose (9) holds for m, that is γ S
m,B(T ) = b
n
t
bns
· γ S
m,U (T ) for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
for all T ⊆ N , T = ∅. We aim to prove (9) for m + 1.
Let S ⊆ N , S = ∅. We prove γ S
m+1,B(T ) = b
n
t
bns
· γ S
m+1,U (T ) for all T ⊆ N , T = ∅.
For the (m + 1)-repeated B-associated game 〈N , v(m+1)∗B〉, we have
(v(m+1)∗B)(S)
= (vB)m∗B(S) by using (m + 1)-repeated B-associated game
(8)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm,B(T ) · vB(T ) by (8) applied to the B-associated game
=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
bnt
bns
· γ Sm,U (T ) · vB(T ) by the induction hypothesis
=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ S
m,U (T )
bns
· (B(vB))(T ) by using the B-scaled game
(7)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ S
m,U (T )
bns
· (Bv)U (T ) by (7)
(8)= 1
bns
· ((Bv)U )m∗U (S) by (8) applied to the associated game
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= 1
bns
· (Bv)(m+1)∗U (S) by using (m + 1)-repeated U-associated game
(8)= 1
bns
·
∑
T ⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm+1,U (T ) · (Bv)(T ) by (8) applied to the game 〈N ,Bv〉
=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ Sm+1,U (T ) ·
bnt
bns
· v(T ) by using the B-scaled game.
Hence, γ S
m+1,B(T ) = γ Sm+1,U (T ) · b
n
t
bns
for all T ⊆ N , T = ∅, due to the unique rep-
resentation (8) applied to the term (v(m+1)∗B)(S). This completes the inductive proof
of (9). The proof of the equality 〈N ,B(vm∗B)〉 = 〈N , (Bv)m∗U 〉 has been completed
before. 
Proof of Theorem 4 (i) Let S ⊆ N , S = ∅. From the game representation (10) for the
limit game 〈N , v˜B〉, together with (15), we derive the following:
v˜B(S)
(10)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ˜ SB(T ) · v(T )
(15)=
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
⎡
⎣b
n
1
bns
·
∑
j∈S
γ˜
{ j}
B (T )
⎤
⎦ · v(T )
=
∑
j∈S
bn1
bns
·
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∑
T⊆N ,
T =∅
γ˜
{ j}
B (T ) · v(T )
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
(10)=
∑
j∈S
bn1
bns
· v˜B({ j})
and hence,
(B(v˜B))(S) = bns · v˜B(S) =
∑
j∈S
bn1 · v˜B({ j}) =
∑
j∈S
(B(v˜B))({ j}).
This proves that the B-scaled game 〈N ,B(v˜B)〉 is inessential, that is, the limit game
〈N , v˜B〉 itself is B-inessential.
(ii) (18) is equivalent to (16) applied to a one-person coalition. Given (18), the proof
of (19) proceeds by induction on t ≥ 1. If t = 1, then (19) reduces to γ˜ {i}B ({i}) = 1n ,
and γ˜ {i}B ({ j}) = −1n·(n−1) for all j ∈ N\{i}, which equalities hold because of (17). So,(19) holds if t = 1. Suppose (19) holds for coalitions of size t − 1. We aim to prove
(19) for any coalition T of size t, t ≥ 2. If i ∈ T ,
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γ˜
{i}
B (T )
(18)= 1
n − t ·
bnt
bnt−1
·
∑
j∈T
γ˜
{i}
B (T \{ j})
= 1
n − t ·
bnt
bnt−1
· b
n
t−1
bn1
·
[
(t − 1)! · (n − t + 1)!
n! −
(t − 1)! · (n − t)!
n!
]
= 1
n − t ·
bnt
bn1
· (t − 1)! · (n − t)!
n! · (n − t)
= b
n
t
bn1
· (t − 1)! · (n − t)!
n!
Thus, (19) is valid if i ∈ T . The case i ∈ T is left to the reader. This completes the
inductive proof of (19). In fact, (19) yields for all i ∈ N , and all S ⊆ N\{i},
γ˜
{i}
B (S) =
−bns
bn1
· s! · (n − 1 − s)!
n! as well as (21)
γ˜
{i}
B (S ∪ {i}) =
bns+1
bn1
· s! · (n − 1 − s)!
n!
From this, together with the game representation (10) for the limit game 〈N , v˜B〉
applied to one-person coalitions, we derive for all i ∈ N
v˜B({i}) (10)=
∑
T ⊆N ,
Ti
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) · v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N\{i},T =∅
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) · v(T )
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
γ˜
{i}
B (S ∪ {i}) · v(S ∪ {i}) +
∑
S⊆N\{i}
γ˜
{i}
B (S) · v(S)
(21)= 1
bn1
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s! · (n − 1 − s)!
n! ·
[
bns+1 · v(S ∪ {i}) − bns · v(S)
]
= 1
bn1
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s! · (n − 1 − s)!
n! · [(Bv)(S ∪ {i}) − (Bv)(S)]
(1)= 1
bn1
· Shi (N ,Bv)
This completes the proof of (20). unionsq
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